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I. INTRODUCTION
Negative campaign advertising has been a staple of American po-
litical tradition since John Adams' victory over Thomas Jefferson in
the 1796 presidential election.1 Citizens coolly received the handbills
distributed to disparage Jefferson's character.2 Observers could not
deny the effectiveness of the negative advertising that helped cata-
pult Adams into the Presidency. 3 No accusation was too strong-
"from drunkenness and gambling to impotence and adultery. '4 Even
Abraham Lincoln was referred to in derogatory terms in nineteenth-
century campaign literature.5 More recently, negative advertising
has taken the form of anonymous telephone calls made to Floridians
by Governor Chiles' reelection campaign, which may have contrib-
uted to his victory over Republican challenger Jeb Bush.6
Florida's voters became upset as they witnessed another example
of why political campaigns are perceived unfavorably. The evidence
is stronger now than at any other time in history that voters' disdain
for negative campaign advertising decreases their faith in the politi-
cal process.7 Furthermore, negative advertising often results in pub-
lic disenchantment with all candidates. 8
1. See Richard Stengel, Accentuating the Negative,- Viewers, Beware: Campaign
Commercials Can Be Nasty, TIME, Feb. 29, 1988, at 46.
2. See BRUCE L. FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS 20-21 (1966).
3. See id.
4. KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND, NEGATIVE POLITICAL ADVER-
TISING: COMING OF AGE 4-5 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. eds., 1991) (quoting G.S. WOOD, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF MIND IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 109, reprinted in THE MORAL
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (R.H. Horwitz ed., 1978)) (discussing the attack ads
found in 1791 publications, including The Gazette of the United States, owned by the Federal-
ist party, and The National Gazette, owned by the Democratic-Republicans); JOHN M. BLUM
ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 144 (4th ed. 1977).
5. See FELKNOR, supra note 2, at 27 (Lincoln was called an "[a]pe, [b]uffoon,
[c]oward, [and a] [d]runkard").
6. See William Booth, Chiles Admits Campaign Made 'Scare Calls' in '94 Florida
Gubernatorial Race, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at A4. The anonymous telephone calls
were made to 70,000 senior citizens in Florida; the aftermath has heightened Florida's
awareness of negative campaign advertising. See David Segal, Fear in Florida Did Scare
Calls Influence a Race Too Close to Call?, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1996, at F13.
7. See L. Patrick Devlin, An Analysis of Presidential Television Commercials, 1952-
1984, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING 21, 23 (Lynda Lee Kaid et al. eds.,
1986).
8. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENaAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW ATTACK
ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 109 (1995).
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A recent poll revealed that almost half of voters aged forty-five to
sixty-four have no confidence in the political process.9 Fifty-eight
percent of Floridians believe that negative campaigning hinders the
political process. 0 Consequently, by using negative advertising,
candidates may actually reduce voter turnout among their own sup-
porters." Despite these statistics, politicians continue to use nega-
tive campaign tactics because of the perception that such tactics re-
main the most effective means of increasing a candidate's support
while simultaneously reducing support for an opposing candidate. 12
Negative campaign advertising is often divided into three cate-
gories: fair, false, and deceptive. 3 Fair ads are those that represent
factual occurrences with the intent of embarrassing an opponent by
accentuating the negative attributes of the opponent's character or
career. 14 While potentially informative to swing voters, 5 these ads
commonly contain abrasive, condescending, and volatile words,
phrases, or images.' s False ads, unlike fair ads, can be challenged
through the Florida Division of Elections if they contain untrue
statements made with actual malice.1
7
Perhaps no campaign technique eludes regulation more than de-
ceptive negative campaign advertising. Deceptive campaign advertis-
ing is misleading and distorts the truth about an opposing candi-
date. "' Consequently, the Florida Department of State (DOS) and the
Florida Legislature targeted these types of advertisements, as well
as other negative campaign tactics, as part of their 1996 elections re-
form package. 9
9. See Howard Troxler & Tom Fiedler, Voters See Government Making Little Prog-
ress, TALL. DEM., Nov. 5, 1995, at 12A (citing Voices of Florida poll conducted by Selzer
Boddy, Inc.).
10. See id.
11. See ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 8, at 109.
12. See L. Patrick Devlin, Political Commercials in American Presidential Elections,
in POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 187-200 (Lynda Lee Kaid & Chris-
tina Holtz-Bacha eds., 1995).
13. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON ETHICS & ELEC., DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING IN
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 3 (1995) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Elec. Reform)
[hereinafter DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING].
14. See Devlin, supra note 12, at 196-97.
15. See id. at 187. "Swing voters are the 10% to 20% of the 50% to 60% of Americans
who vote." Id. Researchers agree that swing voters are most affected by negative cam-
paign advertising because they tend to be the least partisan and the least committed to
candidates until quite close to election day. See id. Swing voters also are largely registered
Independents. See id. "Today one person in three considers him or herself to be an Inde-
pendent; a generation ago, less than one in four did." ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra
note 8, at 97.
16. See Devlin, supra note 12, at 195-96.
17. See FLA. STAT. § 104.271 (1995).
18. See Victor Kamber, Political Discourse Descends Into Trivia, ADVER. AGE, Feb.
1991, at 20.
19. In 1995, DOS's Division of Elections made a few internal election reforms. Some
of the most notable were: establishing a World Wide Web home page that provides instan-
1997]
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Historically, the Florida Legislature has entertained various pro-
posals to regulate negative campaign tactics, in particular negative
campaign advertising. 0 The proposals have ranged from prior notice
requirements to a statewide fair campaign practices board author-
ized to investigate challenged advertisements. 21 The Legislature,
however, never adopted these proposals. Even if they had been
adopted, they likely would not have passed constitutional muster
under the First Amendment. 22
State regulation of political speech is subject to strict scrutiny. 23
To justify regulating the content of political speech, proscribed
statements must be false, must have been made with actual malice,
and parties challenging such statements must satisfy a "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard.24 In addition, the law regulating
the speech cannot be overbroad or vague. 2 Finally, the law cannot
constitute a prior restraint on the time, place, or manner of speech.26
The First Amendment offers the broadest protection of free speech
during political campaigns; 27 therefore, any laws that regulate nega-
tive campaigning are subject to strict scrutiny.28
This Comment examines the negative campaign tactics that have
been employed by Florida candidates, with particular emphasis on
negative campaign advertising. Part II attempts to define negative
advertising. Part III discusses the constitutional limitations on
regulation of campaign advertising. Part IV examines the role that
negative campaign advertising plays in Florida politics and reviews
historical attempts to address negative campaign advertising
through both legislative and nonlegislative means. Part V evaluates
taneous access to county-by-county election totals; providing on-line access to Florida
Administrative Weekly; and accepting electronic filing of campaign treasurer's reports and
granting the public access to the information at no cost. See FLA. DEP'T OF STATE,
CAMPAIGN & ELECTION REFORM LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 2-3 (1996); see also Division of
Elections (visited Sept. 27, 1996) <http://election.dos.state.fl.us>. The Division's e-mail ad-
dress is <election@mail.dos.state.fl.us>.
20. See, e.g., Fla. HB 1319 (1975) (proposing the creation of an elections board to hear
elections complaints).
21. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 3.
22. See, e.g., Fla. HB 669 (1995) (proposing to make negative advertisements illegal).
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech .. " U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment is made applicable to the
states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
23. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 n.3 (1992).
24. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
25. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) ("Where First
Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of
drafting and clarity of purpose are essential.").
26. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
27. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (the First Amendment has its "fullest
and most urgent application" to political campaigns).
28. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 40.
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the success of legislation, enacted by Florida and other states, that
attempts to regulate negative campaign advertising. Part VI ana-
lyzes the attempts of DOS and the Florida Legislature during the
1996 Regular Session to enact legislation aimed at curing the use of
negative campaigning.
Part VII concludes that the First Amendment protects those poli-
ticians who engage in negative campaign tactics, while narrowly re-
stricting those who truly remain committed to campaign reform.
Part VII further concludes that DOS, as the state's chief regulatory
agency for elections, needs to apply more pressure to the political
leadership to challenge powerful lobbies and to make meaningful
campaign reform a legislative priority. Finally, Part VII offers a
challenge to Florida citizens to participate in cleaning up negative
campaign tactics.
II. DEFINING NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
No single definition of negative campaign advertising exists. The
most simplistic definition is "a mud-slinging ad."2 9 One view is that
negative campaign advertising consists of forcefully and persua-
sively attacking an opponent's strength-and highlighting the
weaknesses within-with facts that can be documented. 30 One com-
mentator believes that negative campaign advertising involves an ad
that "attacks the other candidate personally, the issues for which the
other candidate stands, or the party of the other candidate."'" An-
other view believes that it is defining one's opponent with negative
information to instill anxiety in the observer,3 2 while yet another
view suggests that negative campaign advertising is simply a
method of contrasting candidates with their opponents via an emo-
tive component.3 Despite the varying definitions, most campaign
analysts agree that negative campaign advertising "degrad[es] per-
ceptions of the rival, to the advantage of the sponsor."
3 4
29. Charles J. Stewart, Voter Perception of Mud-Slinging in Political Communica-
tion, CENT. STS. SPEECH J. 279, 279 (1975).
30. See Terry Cooper, Negative Image, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Sept. 1991, at 21;
DECEPTIVE & FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 5.
31. Gina M. Garromone, Voter Response to Negative Political Ads, JOURNALISM Q.
251,253 (1984).
32. See Devlin, supra note 12, at 198-99; Bill Huey, Where's the Beef?, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, June 1995, at 67.
33. See Adam Goodman, Going Negative! Producing TV A Survival Guide, CAM-
PAIGNS AND ELECTIONS, July 1995, at 22. Generally, campaign strategists have a laissez-
faire attitude about negative campaign advertising. Some operate by a code of "fairness."
See discussion infra Part II.A. Those who teach in schools of communication across the
United States seem to have the greatest reservations about negative campaigning and the
strongest views about what constitutes negative campaigning.
34. Sharyne Merritt, Negative Political Advertising: Some Empirical Findings, J.
ADVER. 27, 30 (1984).
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Negative campaign advertising seeks to "prevent the development
of bonds of identification and empathy between the opposing candi-
date and the viewer by linking the opponent with a threat. '35 Nega-
tive advertisements also diminish the voters' ability to assess candi-
dates and their views by oversimplifying issues and painting dis-
torted pictures of a candidate's character. 36 With these general goals
achieved, the swing voters' opinions of candidates become malleable
and open to influence by campaign strategists. 7
Some campaigns become so divisive as a result of negative cam-
paign advertising that they engender more hostility to the ad's spon-
sor than to the candidate being attacked.3 8 If all candidates employ
negative campaign advertising in an election, voters may become de-
sensitized to the entire process.3 9 Some commentators express con-
cern that negative ads highlight negative reactions: "[It is not al-
ways the most liked candidate, but more the least disliked candidate
who wins the election."40
Nevertheless, it is widely believed by campaign strategists that
an ad can only present all of the reasons why voters should vote for
one candidate by presenting the reasons why voters should not vote
for the candidate's opponent. 41 As one media consultant succinctly
put it: "The most effective negative ads are deadly serious; they work
because they make voters mad at your opponent. '42
Although negative ads may upset many voters and candidates,
campaign strategists continue to use them aggressively. Generally,
the types of negative campaign advertising used will depend upon
the nature of the campaign-the more narrow the margin between
the candidates in the opinion polls, the more belittling the adver-
tisements tend to be.43 "Negativity, alone, isn't the real culprit; dis-
honesty is. That's where a realistic line between right and wrong
must be drawn. 44
Many campaign strategists agree that a line can be drawn be-
tween legitimate attacks on an opponent's record and planned, con-
35. Peter F. May, State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the
Tide of Deceptive Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 182 (1992) (quoting Montague
Kern, Professor of Communications, Rutgers University).
36. See Kamber, supra note 18, at 20.
37. See Devlin, supra note 12, at 187.
38. See JOHNSON-CARTEE & COPELAND, supra note 4, at 9.
39. See id.
40. Devlin, supra note 12, at 197.
41. See DECEPTIVE & FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 9-11.
42. David Doak, Going Negative! Attack Ads: Rethinking the Rules, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, July 1995, at 21.
43. See id. at 21; Devlin, supra note 12, at 193-97. In Florida, these have ranged from
the biographical ads in Connie Mack's 1994 Senate campaign to the fierce attack ads in
the 1994 gubernatorial campaign.
44. Ron Faucheux, Unfair Ads, Push Polls, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Apr. 1996, at 5.
[Vol. 24:463
NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
descendingly emotive strikes designed to inflame voters. 5 Consistent
with this distinction, negative campaign advertising is often divided
into three categories: fair, false, and deceptive.
46
A. "Fair" Negative Campaign Advertising
Some campaign strategists suggest that if an advertisement is
true, fair, and relevant, it can be aired in good conscience. 47 Under
this approach, advertising that addresses documented statements
from the political career of an opposing candidate is "fair," even if
negative.4 One political consultant believes that a "fair" advertise-
ment should not only be accurate, but also should represent oppo-
nents fairly and be based upon facts contained in the public record. 49
Another expert identifies types of ads with three similar charac-
teristics as examples of "fair" negative campaign advertising: ads
that (1) contrast written or publicly proclaimed ideas, positions, or
attitudes, (2) attack a candidate's lack of experience and qualifica-
tions for office, or (3) highlight an opponent's public voting record
with appropriate and irrefutable citation.50
B. "False" Negative Campaign Advertising
"[T]he right to attack doesn't license lies, in any form."" False
campaign advertising is prohibited in many states, and defamation
suits often arise when such advertising is used.5" However, because
defamation suits usually outlast campaigns, they are generally inef-
fective in providing an adequate remedy before the election.5 3 Fur-
thermore, a candidate trying to recover from the presumed damage
inflicted upon his or her polling percentages by false advertising will
be hard-pressed to file a lawsuit during a political campaign.5 4
C. 'Deceptive" Negative Campaign Advertising
Deceptive campaign advertising distorts the truth to the detri-
ment of the opponent. The deception may go so far as to appear to
45. See Goodman, supra note 33, at 22.
46. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 5.
47. See John Franzdn, Common Sense on Going Negative, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS,
Sept. 1995, at 67.
48. See id.
49. See Doak, supra note 42, at 20.
50. See Goodman, supra note 33, at 22.
51. Faucheux, supra note 44, at 5.
52. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 6.
53. See id. at 6.7.
54. See Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech to Cleanse Political Campaigns, 21 CAP.
U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1992).
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make the advertisement false. Because it contains an element of
truth, however, the advertisement is not technically false.55
Once it used to be that if there was one thing that wasn't true in
an ad it destroyed the whole credibility of the ad. Press and public
reaction would force [a candidate] to pull it off the air. Now [public
reaction] ha[s] gone the other way. Innuendo and accusation are
built on one accuracy-if one statement is true, almost anything
else [a candidate] say[s] in an ad must also be true."
This perspective is not only accurate, it is reflected in constitutional
case law, which only prohibits false statements made with actual
malice. 57
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
As a form of political speech, negative campaign advertising is
protected by the First Amendment.5 8 The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated, however, that political speech is not automatically entitled to
constitutional protection.59 Further, calculated falsehoods do not
constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.60 Neverthe-
less, misleading or deceptive campaign advertising remains pro-
tected under the First Amendment as a part of the "robust and wide
open"6 ' debate that "may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cia ls .62
A. Content-Based Regulation
The leading case regarding regulation of the content of political
speech is New York Times v. Sullivan.6 3 In Sullivan, an elected offi-
cial sued the New York Times for libel for publishing an advertise-
ment that allegedly represented the official's activities falsely.64 The
Court concluded that "neither factual error, which is inevitable in
free debate, nor defamatory content, which injures [a public figure's]
reputation, is sufficient to remove the constitutional protection from
such statements. '65 The Court thereby fashioned a standard under
55. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 6.
56. Devlin, supra note 12, at 200. Devlin makes this point because while many voters
are turned off by negative campaign advertising, a great many would rather enjoy the po-
litical arena's soap-opera style than deal with issues. See May, supra note 35, at 179.
57. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
58. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420-21 (1988).
59. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
60. See id. at 75 (citing Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
61. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
62. Id.
63. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
64. See id. at 255.
65. Id. at 273.
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which a public official may seek redress for a statement in a political
advertisement only by proving by clear and convincing evidence 61
"that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was
false or [not] ."6
The Court subsequently elaborated upon the actual malice stan-
dard in St. Amant v. Thompson.6 8 In St. Amant, a public official sued
his opponent for making false statements about his actions with
"reckless disregard" during a television broadcast.69 The Court, rely-
ing upon Sullivan, held that reckless disregard could not be shown
by proof of mere negligence.70 Rather, the public official must prove
that the speaker had strong suspicions regarding the truth of the in-
formation: "Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." 7'
In Vanasco v. Schwartz,71 the Court affirmed a lower court's ex-
pansion of the actual malice requirement to apply to state regulation
of political campaign speech. 71 In Vanasco, the New York State
Board of Elections had found that a candidate violated the New York
Fair Campaign Code74 by misrepresenting his party endorsement
during a campaign'7 However, the Board had failed to determine
whether actual malice existed, and had required a "substantial evi-
dence" rather than a "clear and convincing" standard for the burden
66. The Court actually used the phrase "convincing clarity" to describe the plaintiffs
burden of proof. See id. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court used
the more traditional term "clear and convincing evidence" to characterize the plaintiffs
burden in such cases. See id. at 342.
67. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. While falsity had been a familiar element of proof in
libel claims brought by public officials, actual malice-requiring knowledge or reckless
disregard of falsity-had not. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 16.33, at 1090-91 (5th ed. 1995).
68. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
69. See id. at 728-29.
70. See id. at 730-31.
71. Id. at 731.
72. 423 U.S. 1041 (1976), affg 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
73. See 401 F. Supp. at 92.
74. Among other things, the New York Fair Campaign Code prohibited the following:
(c) Attacks on a candidate based on race, sex, religion or ethnic background;
(d) Misrepresentation of any candidate's qualifications including personal
vilification, character defamation, whispering campaigns, libel, slander, or
scurrilous attacks on any candidate, his or her staff, or personal or family life,
or misuse of title or misuse of the phrase "re-elect";
(e) Misrepresentation of any candidate's position, including misrepresenta-
tion of political issues or voting record, use of false or misleading quotations or
attributing a particular position to a candidate solely by virtue of a candidate's
membership in an organization; and(f) Misrepresentation of any candidate's party affiliation or party endorse-
ment by persons or organizations, including use of doctored photographs or
writing or fraudulent or untrue endorsements.
Id. app. at 101.
75. See id. at 89.
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of proof.7 6 The district court found the Code unconstitutional because
it was overbroad, vague, and did not meet the Sullivan test, i.e., it
did not require a showing of actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence." Further, the district court expressed concern that the
New York statute did not provide for immediate judicial review.78
Thus, after Vanasco, a state statute attempting to regulate the con-
tent of political speech requires a clear and convincing showing of ac-
tual malice and must provide for immediate judicial review of any de-
cision by a state agency charged with hearing claims under the statute.
A clear statement of opposition to the Sullivan standard came
from Justice Byron White.7 9 Justice White argued that Sullivan
struck an "improvident balance ... between the public's interest in
being fully informed .. .and the competing interest of those who
have been defamed in vindicating their reputations."80 Justice White
also urged the Court to permit a strict liability test through which a
public official would be awarded damages if the official could simply
show that the statement were false.8' Such an approach, according to
Justice White, would permit a defamed public figure to clear his or
her name.8 2 Notwithstanding Justice White's urgings, however, the
Court has consistently reaffirmed its holding in Sullivan and ap-
pears unlikely to reexamine its position in the near future.8 3
B. Content-Neutral Regulation
Some states have employed creative methods in attempting to cir-
cumvent the Sullivan requirement for content-based regulation by
regulating the time, place, or manner of the speech.84 These states
have found the Supreme Court's standard for the regulation of such
content-neutral speech equally stringent: a time, place, or manner
restriction must (1) be justified without reference to the content of
the speech; (2) be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial govern-
ment interest; and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.8 '
In Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered whether a portion of the Pennsylvania Elections
76. See id. at 98-99.
77. See id. at 94-95.
78. See id. at 99.
79. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 767.
81. See id. at 772.
82. See id. at 769.
83. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Comm., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989).
84. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 11.
85. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308 (1984).
86. 422 A.2d 124 (Pa. 1980).
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Code was unconstitutional because it imposed a sanction upon any
candidate who published a political advertisement about an oppo-
nent without previously filing a copy of the advertisement with the
county board of elections.87 Because prescribed notice requirements
have the effect of chilling speech before it is uttered, the crux of the is-
sue was whether the Pennsylvania notice requirement constituted a
prior restraint. 8 Notice requirements in this case effectively forced
the candidate to obtain a license to speak from the state.8 9 Although
the state argued that the notice requirement was a reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction, the court held that required disclo-
sure of political advertising and the associated waiting period for
publishing the advertisement were unconstitutional because these
requirements severely limited a candidate's ability to disseminate
information. 90
C. Regulation of Elections
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that states have a le-
gitimate interest in regulating the elections of their own officials.'
This interest, however, often comes into direct conflict with the con-
stitutionally protected free speech rights of candidates. 92 Thus, the
Court has required that laws attempting to regulate the speech of po-
litical candidates during elections be narrowly tailored: "Because the
right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our constitu-
tional system, statutory classifications impinging upon that right must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. '93
In Buckley v. Valeo,94 for example, the Court stated that some
regulation of campaign speech may withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.9 1 The Court rejected the argument that disclosure requirements
and limitations upon political contributions reduce the quantity of
political expression through prior restraint and restrict the freedom
of political association." In addition, the Court upheld the federal
public financing scheme, which provided presidential candidates
87. See id. at 126.
88. See id. at 135.
89. See Interview with Steven G. Gey, Professor of Constitutional Law, Florida State
University, Tallahassee, Fla. (Oct. 25, 1995).
90. See Wadzinski, 422 A.2d at 130-31.
91. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1970) (noting that the Tenth
Amendment reserves to states the power to regulate elections of state officials); see also
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
92. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 12.
93. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990) (citing Police
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U S. 92, 101 (1972)).
94. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
95. See id. at 20-22.
96. See id. at 20-21.
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public funds in exchange for waiving their constitutional free speech
rights to spend unlimited amounts of money in their campaigns. 7
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,"8 the Court addressed
the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that provided for a blanket
prohibition on all forms of anonymous political publications. 9 The
plaintiff contended that the statute impermissibly infringed upon an
individual's right to anonymously draft and distribute leaflets, which in
this case were distributed in opposition to an imminent referendum on a
proposed school tax levy.00 The Court agreed with the plaintiff, finding
that the Ohio statute violated First Amendment free speech guarantees
because it was not narrowly tailored to effectuate the state's compelling
interest in preventing fraud and libel in the election process. 10
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia warned that permitting
anonymous political publication would result in more negative cam-
paign tactics:
The usefulness of a signing requirement lies not only in promoting
observance of the law against campaign falsehoods .... It lies also in
promoting a civil and dignified level of campaign debate .... Ob-
servers of the past few national elections have expressed concern
about the increase of character assassination--"mudslinging" is the
colloquial term--engaged in by political candidates and their sup-
porters to the detriment of the democratic process. Not all of this, in
fact not much of it, consists of actionable untruth; most is innuendo,
or demeaning characterization, or mere disclosure of items of per-
sonal life that have no bearing upon suitability for office. Imagine
how much all of this would increase if it could be done anony-
mously 0 2
D. States'Rights
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed the State
of Ohio to regulate political speech in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections
Commission.0 3 In Pestrak, the court partially upheld an Ohio law
that prohibited false political speech made with actual malice and
empowered the Ohio Elections Commission to hold adjudicatory
97. See id. at 23-25.
98. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
99. See id. at 1514.
100. See id. at 1518.
101. See id. The Court's decision suggests that a more tightly drafted statute could
withstand strict scrutiny. See id. at 1522. Section 106.143, Florida Statutes, is similar to
the Ohio statute struck down by McIntyre, suggesting that Florida's statutory ban on all
anonymously written political advertising may be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the
McIntyre Court instructed that its decision be read narrowly and specifically reserved
ruling on whether its decision would apply to other forms of unidentified communication,
such as radio or television ads. See id. at 1514 n.3.
102. Id. at 1536 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
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hearings to enforce violations of the statute.0 4 The statute author-
ized the Commission to enforce violations through four distinct
means: cease and desist orders, fines, recommendations to the
county prosecutor for criminal prosecution, and publication of
Commission findings. 105 The court found that the actual malice re-
quirement in the statute was consistent with Sullivan and thus held
that portion of the statute constitutional. 0 6 However, the court in-
validated those sections of the statute that empowered the Commis-
sion to issue fines and cease and desist orders because the statute
did not provide for immediate judicial review and lacked a "clear and
convincing" burden of proof standard.0 7 Nevertheless, the court
found that the Commission did not violate the First Amendment
simply by making and publishing findings on the veracity of certain
political statements.' 8 The court compared this situation to govern-
ment speech in other fora, such as when government-sponsored news
media make pronouncements on the truthfulness of statements
made by public officials. 0 9 Thus, the Pestrak court recognized the
right of the government, through an adjudicatory hearing, to evalu-
ate the veracity of political speech, provided the Sullivan require-
ments are satisfied.
E. Constitutional Challenges to Florida's Election Laws
Challenges to Florida law based upon McIntyre are being made in
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida"0 and in the
Florida Second Circuit Court."' Plaintiffs in both cases are challeng-
104. See id. at 575-76.
105. See id. at 578.
106. See id. at 577.
107. See id. at 578.
108. See id. at 579-80.
109. See id. at 579. The Pestrak court noted that an "even more egregious" government
intervention in the electoral process had been upheld in a recent Ninth Circuit case. See id.
at 580. In Geary v. Renne, 914 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1990) (Geary 1), reh'g granted, 924 F.2d 175
(9th Cir. 1991), withdrawn and superseded, 2 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Geary I/)), a
Ninth Circuit panel upheld a California statute that allowed local governments to strike false
or misleading statements from government-published voter information pamphlets. See id. at
1256. The panel found it significant that the pamphlet was prepared and distributed by the
government, and concluded that the statute did not suppress protected expression because
the government did not attempt to keep the deleted material from reaching the public
through other means. See id. at 1252-53. Three years later, however, after the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in the parallel case of Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991) (finding moot
claim that party endorsements had been deleted from candidate statements in government-
sponsored brochures), the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated and dismissed Geary I
without prejudice for lack of a justiciable controversy. See Geary II, 2 F.3d at 990.
110. See Roe v. Florida Elections Comm'n., No. 94-308-CIV-FTM-23D (M.D. Fla. filed
Sept. 30, 1994).
111. See Doe v. Mortham, No. 96-630 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 6, 1996) (challenging
the constitutionality of related Florida statutes dealing with disclosure and identification
requirements involving miscellaneous advertisements and endorsements).
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ing the facial constitutionality of sections 106.071 and 106.143(1),
Florida Statutes."' Both cases involve individuals making or seeking
to make independent expenditures." 3 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has not addressed these issues. Nevertheless, federal dis-
trict courts within the Eleventh Circuit, and even the U.S. Supreme
Court, have held unconstitutional several Florida statutes and local
ordinances seeking to curb negative campaign tactics.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"4 the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether section 104.38, Florida Statutes, which
granted a political candidate the right to equal space to reply to a
newspaper's editorial criticisms" 5 violated the free press guarantee
of the First Amendment." 6 Citing Sullivan for the principle that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," 1 7 the Court held the statute unconstitutional, stating that "a
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press re-
sponsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other
virtues it cannot be legislated.""' The Court implied that any gov-
ernmental regulation of a newspaper's editorial treatment of public
issues and officials would likely violate the Constitution's free press
guarantee."19
Gore Newspapers Co. v. Shevin,2 0 a federal district court case, in-
volved a challenge to a Florida statute enacted to curb last-minute
"smear tactics" against candidates. 2 ' The statute in question prohib-
ited both "new" attacks and the republication of old charges and ad-
verse information raised earlier in a campaign.2 2 Relying in part
upon Tornillo-and, like the Tornillo Court, noting that a responsi-
ble press cannot be legislated-the court held that the statute vio-
lated the First Amendment.' 3
The Florida Supreme Court also held unconstitutional a munici-
pal ordinance making it a crime for any person to publish or circu-
late a charge or attack against a candidate during the last seven
days of an election campaign, unless the charge had been personally
112. See Complaint at 1, Roe (No. 94-308-CIV-FTM-23D); Complaint at 3, Doe (No. 96-
630).
113. See Complaint at 1, Roe (No. 94-308-CIV-FTM-23D); Complaint at 3, Doe (No. 96-
630).
114. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
115. See FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973).
116. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 242.
117. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
118. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
119. See id. at 254-56.
120. 397 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1975), off d, 550 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1977).
121. See id. at 1257-58 (citing FLA. STAT. § 104.35 (1973)).
122. See id. at 1257.
123. See id. at 1257-58.
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served upon the candidate at least seven days before the election. 2 4
The ordinance permitted candidates a meaningful opportunity to re-
spond to last-minute, negative attacks. 12 5 Citing various free press
cases, including Tornillo, the court found that the statute violated
the First Amendment's free speech and free press guarantees. 126
IV. THE ROLE OF NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING IN FLORIDA
POLITICS
A. The Political Landscape
In November 1996, all 120 seats in the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives were up for election, as well as twenty of the forty seats in
the Florida Senate.1 2 1 In the House, Republicans took control for the
first time since Reconstruction, winning a two-seat margin. 128 In the
Senate, Republicans hold a six-seat margin. 29 "Now that Republi-
cans have caught up, and the parties are competing on equal terms,
most of the weakest legislators already have been swept out of office
.... [a]ll the low-hanging fruit has been cut .... It's time for hand-
to-hand, trench warfare."'30 Negative campaign advertising is viewed
as an ideal weapon for such fierce battles because it enables a cam-
paign committee to divide voters, shape views, and define the oppo-
sition in a highly negative light.
Negative campaign advertising draws voters' attention away from
campaign issues.' 3 ' It discourages meaningful examination of cam-
paign issues by oversimplifying them through soundbites and catch
phrases that ultimately degrade the democratic process.'32 Although
it is true that "[d]emocratic theory assumes that voters will evaluate
candidates on the basis of the information that is available to
them,"'3 3 if the information is skewed from the initial point of pres-
entation, then voters are unable to synthesize the information objec-
tively. As a result, voters must act based upon their emotions. Unfor-
tunately, negative campaign advertising may force candidates to be-
124. See Town of Lantana v. Pelczynski, 303 So. 2d 326, 326-27 (Fla. 1974).
125. See id. at 327-28.
126. See id.
127. See Howard Troxier, Battle Lines, Party Lines, ST. PETE. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at
lB.
128. There are now 61 Republicans and 59 Democrats in the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives. See Lucy Morgan, Chiles Tries to Make the Best of GOP Situation, ST. PETE.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at 6B.
129. There are now 23 Republicans and 17 Democrats in the Florida Senate. See id.
130. Troxler, supra note 127 (quoting Assistant Secretary of State Rich Hefley). Hefley
ran Republican legislative campaigns before becoming assistant secretary of state. See id.
131. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 6.
132. See id.
133. Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising: The Role of
Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 863 (1987).
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come preoccupied with defending against their opponents' attacks
out of fear that not responding will increase the risk of losing the
election.3 4
Negative advertising is popular in Florida because of its suc-
cess.131 For example, in 1994, former Representative Ron Glickman
116
was defeated by Faye Culp, a local school board member.'3 7 Culp got
a last-minute boost from a Republican Party brochure, which alleged
that "Ron Glickman claims four titles: liberal, lawyer, legislator, liar.
It's time to take one away."'38 Glickman lost by twenty votes.1
39
Another vivid example of a negative campaign attack came dur-
ing the 1994 election, when a Republican named Hugh Brotherton
challenged former Representative Vernon Peeples. 4 0 According to
the Democrat's brochure,
Brotherton got into a feud with a neighbor over flooding between
their lawns. Instead of going for an agreement, Brotherton turned on
the pipes and let the water flow. . . right into his neighbor's yard.
And Brotherton didn't quit until his neighbor's lawn was completely
flooded. Vote no on Hugh John Brotherton. He's Just Weird.'
4 1
This ad was untrue. Brotherton was actually sued by the neighbor
because he built a berm in his own yard. 4 2 Brotherton lost the elec-
tion and is suing for libel.
4 3
134. See Devlin, supra note 12, at 197. Michael Dukakis waited too long to respond to
George Bush's attack ads in the 1988 presidential campaign. See ANSOLABEHERE &
IYENGAR, supra note 8, at 4. The infamous "Willie Horton" ad portrayed Dukakis as inef-
fective on crime. See id. Consequently, 34% of those who voted for the Dukakis/Bentsen
ticket did so because they "liked" the candidates, whereas 50% of those who voted against the
ticket did so because of doubts engendered by the ads. See Devlin, supra note 12, at 197.
135. "Negative ads are employed in Florida because they work." Philip J. Troutine, Ly-
ing With the Facts, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, May 1991, at 16 (quoting Democratic poll-
ster Mark Mellman). Just three years earlier Mellman had stated, "If you're filling empty
heads, it's a lot easier to do it with negatives." Robert Guskind & Jerry Hagstrom, lt the
Gutter, 20 NAT'L J. 2782 (Nov. 5, 1988).
136. Dem., Tampa, 1986-1994.
137. See Beverly Hills Retiree Ready to Get to Work, ST. PETE. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at
7B.
138. Peter Mitchell, Low Fliers: The Worst Political Mail of 1994, WALL ST. J., Nov.
16, 1994, at F4.
139. See id.
140. Dem., Punta Gorda, 1982-1996. Representative Peeples was a prominent member
of the Committee on House Ethics & Elections and was affectionately considered the
Committee's "historian."
141. Troxler, supra note 127.
142. See id.
143. See id. This case was closed on July 26, 1995, with a finding of no probable cause
by the Division of Elections. See Division of Elections v. Peeples, FFEC No. 95-002,
Statement of Findings 4 (July 25, 1995) (on file with Fla. Elec. Comm'n). Brotherton im-
mediately appealed this finding. See Letter from Hugh J. Brotherton to David Rancourt,
Director, Div. of Elec. (July 26, 1995) (on file with Fla. Elec. Comm'n) (requesting a hear-
ing before the Elections Commission). Brotherton withdrew his appeal on November 15,
1995, and filed a civil suit for libel against Peeples. See Letter from Hugh J. Brotherton to
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B. History of Regulation Attempts
The Florida Legislature began considering various forms of cam-
paign advertising regulation as early as the mid-1970s. A 1974 pro-
posal required candidates to pledge that they would conduct a fair
campaign.1 44 Complaints of unfair campaign advertisements and re-
buttals to those complaints would have been heard by a county elec-
tions board, which would then have released relevant documents to
the media.1 4 5 In 1975, a similar bill was proposed that provided for a
mandatory code but removed the provisions for filing complaints
with a county elections board.'4 The bill analysis indicated that the
complaint provision was removed because the Florida House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Elections felt "that public exposure and
opinion would be enough of a penalty for violating the oath."1 47 In the
1980s, legislators filed several bills prohibiting candidates from
making false statements about themselves and providing civil pen-
alties for violating the prohibition. 4 8
In 1986, Secretary of State George Firestone included a "Pledge of
Fair Campaign Practices" in packets of information sent to candi-
dates by DOS.1 49 The pledge was strictly voluntary.110 DOS included
David Rancourt, Director, Div. of Elec. (Nov. 2, 1995) (on file with Fla. Elec. Comm'n)
(withdrawing previous request for hearing and attaching a copy of a complaint filed in
Florida's 20th Judicial Circuit).
144. See DECEPTIVE AND NEGATIVE ADVERTISING, supro note 13, at 20.
145. See id.
146. See Fla. HB 1319 (1975).
147. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Elec., HB 1319 (1975) Staff Analysis 2 (final Apr. 21, 1975)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
148. See DECEPTIVE AND FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 20.
149. See id. at 22. The pledge stated:
Pledge of Fair Campaign Practices: There are basic principles of decency,
honesty, and fair play which every candidate for public office in the Unites
States and the state of Florida has a moral obligation to observe and uphold in
order that, after vigorously contested but fairly conducted campaign, our citi-
zens may exercise their constitutional right to a free and untrammeled choice
and the will of the people may be fully and clearly expressed on the issues be-
fore the county and state,
Therefore:
I shall conduct my campaign in the best American tradition, discussing the
issues as I see them,
I shall present my record and policies with sincerity and frankness, and
criticizing without fear or favor, the record and policies of my opponents and
their parties which merit such criticism.
I shall defend and uphold the right of every qualified American voter to full
and equal participation in the electoral process.
I shall condemn the use of personal vilification, character defamation, whis-
pering campaigns, libel, slander, or scurrilous attacks on any candidates or on
their personal or family lives.
I shall condemn the use of campaign material of any sort which misrepre-
sents, distorts, or otherwise falsifies the facts regarding accusations against
any candidates which aim at creating or exploiting doubts, without justifica-
tion, as to their loyalty and patriotism.
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signed pledges as part of the candidates' campaign files.15 However,
there was no enforcement of the pledge.'52 DOS did not officially ac-
knowledge the pledge and consequently could not make statements
about candidate adherence.13
In 1995, Secretary of State Sandra B. Mortham announced a
package of campaign and election law reform proposals that included
a fair campaign practices code.1 4 The goal of the package was to es-
tablish a bipartisan fair campaign practices board to handle com-
plaints of unfair campaign tactics."5 The board, operating under the
auspices of DOS, would have heard complaints statewide."16 In addi-
tion, the package would have required a notice of candidate authori-
zation within the standard disclaimer."17 This new disclaimer also
would have been required on all paid telephone contacts and cam-
paign messages placed on the Internet."
58
Other proposals included defining a cap on party contributions to
candidates and eliminating primaries. 1 9 Every proposal that re-
quired legislative approval failed. ' °
C. Nonlegislative Solutions
1. The LeRoy Collins Center for Public Policy
In October 1991, a group of approximately sixty Florida citizens
convened in Tallahassee at the LeRoy Collins Center for Public Pol-
I shall condemn any appeal to bigotry based on race, creed, sex, or nation origin.
I shall condemn any dishonest or unethical practice which tends to corrupt
or undermine our American dream or free elections or which hampers or pre-
vents the full and free expression of the will of the voters.
I shall immediately and publicly repudiate support deriving from any indi-
vidual or group which resorts, on behalf of my candidacy or in opposition to
that of my opponent, to the methods and tactics which I condemn.
I, the undersigned candidate for election to public office in the United States
of America and the State of Florida, hereby endorse, subscribe to and solemnly
pledge myself to conduct my campaign in accordance with the above principles
and practices.
Id. app. A.




154. See Press Release from Fla. Dep't of State, Mortham Proposes Campaign & Elec-






160. See Martin Dyckman, Election Reform Stalled on the Tracks, ST. PETE. TIMES,
May 2, 1996, at A15; see also discussion infra Part VI.F. One reason the reform proposals
failed was because Governor Lawton Chiles was adamantly opposed to removing any pub-
lic financing provisions from the election laws. See Dyckman, supra, at A15.
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icy. 16 1 The bipartisan gathering consisted of representatives from
public and private sector interest groups, governmental institutions,
and the media.' 6 Their goal was to create a proposal aimed at halt-
ing the use of unfair and deceptive negative campaign practices.' 63
Among the issues discussed were citizen participation in the elec-
toral process, voluntary actions to increase voter participation, and a
voluntary code for fair campaign practices.' 64
161. See COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y, POLICY STATEMENT: POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
PRACTICES AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1991) (providing con-
clusions and recommendations of 60 bipartisan conference participants who met in Talla-
hassee, Florida, to discuss fair campaign practices in Florida) (on file with Div. of Elec.).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. The proposed Florida Voluntary Code of Fair Campaign Practices read:
To refresh the people's participation in their democratic process, Florida's
citizens should expect their candidates for public office at all levels to observe
and uphold standards of fairness and honesty during election campaigns so as
to give voters a clear look at the personal values that motivate their candida-
cies and a clean choice on the political issues that define their differences.
Along with the candidates, the news media and the general public play their
own parts in the self-governing process. This voluntary code addresses all
three and invites all to subscribe.
The Candidates
As I seek public office in Florida, I honor the following principles as a guide
to conduct which the public is entitled to expect of me:
1. 1 will address valid issues in my campaign, will tell the truth as to my in-
tentions if I am elected, and will fight fairly in any contest with my oppo-
nent(s).
2. I will shun demagoguery that seeks to deflect the public's attention to
sham issues that obscure real concerns of the electorate.
3. I will limit my attacks on an opponent to legitimate challenges to that per-
son's record, qualifications, and positions.
4. I will neither use nor permit the use of malicious untruths or scurrilous
innuendos about an opponent's personal life nor will I make or condone un-
founded accusations discrediting that person's integrity.
5. I will take personal responsibility for approving or disavowing the sub-
stance of attacks on my opponent that may come from third parties supporting
my candidacy.
6. I will not use or permit the use of campaign material that falsifies, dis-
torts, or misrepresents facts.
7. I will neither use nor permit the use of appeals to bigotry in any form, and
specifically to prejudice based on race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, or na-
tional origin.
8. I will neither use nor permit the use of last-minute charges made without
giving my opponent reasonable time in which to respond before election day.
9. I will demand that persons or organizations supporting me maintain these
standards of fairness.
10. I will repudiate any abuses of this code.
The News Media
As a journalist, free under the First Amendment to report to the people on
their election process, I honor the following principles as a guide to my profes-
sional conduct which the public should reasonably expect of me:
1. I will report the campaigns of all candidates fairly and will ensure their
access to equitable coverage. While editorial expression of preferences in
spaces reserved for opinion is an expected part of a robust press in a free soci-
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The group also recommended steps for the news media and the
public to take to clean up elections, including: emphasizing issues
rather than a candidate's image; encouraging the use of ad watches
by the media; encouraging organizations supporting or opposing
candidates and/or issues to maintain consistent standards of fair-
ness; encouraging candidates to endorse all campaign materials and
requiring candidates to disclose whether they have endorsed an ad-
vertisement; encouraging the media to ensure that candidates re-
ceive equitable coverage and expanded access; and ensuring that
campaigns, advertisements, and dialogue are based upon facts. 165
Two fair campaign practice groups have formed in Florida as an
outgrowth of the Collins Center for Public Policy gathering: Citizens
for Fair Campaign Practices in Pinellas County and the Dade
County Fair Campaign Practices Committee.
2. Citizens for Fair Campaign Practice
The Citizens for Fair Campaign Practices formed in 1993 in
Pinellas County to implement the Voluntary Code of Fair Campaign
Practices. 6' The Citizens for Fair Campaign Practices is open to all
ety, the news presentation of political debate presupposes fair access to the
public ear for the messages of all candidates.
2. I will emphasize coverage of candidates' stands on substantive issues and I
will not allow my coverage to be distracted by images that some candidates
seek to substitute for substance.
3. I will listen to the citizens and convey their concerns to the candidates
through my questioning as a reporter, and in turn I will persist in efforts to
elicit the candidates' responses to those concerns.
4. While offering news space or time to candidates who seek to state positions
on serious issues, I have a like duty to draw the public's attention to the means
by which less-than-honest campaigners may seek to mislead, distort, or falsify.
5. When accepting campaign advertising, I will require the identity of the
person or organization buying the ad to appear with the ad; if the advertise-
ment (including television commercial) in behalf of a candidate attacks an op-
ponent, I will ask the candidate to state personally as a part of the ad itself
whether the candidate approves or disapproves of it; and I will keep a watch
on campaign advertising so as to monitor and consistently publicize misrepre-
sentations or untruths that may appear in advertisements in any of the news
media including my own channel, frequency or publication.
The Public
As the 20th century closes, peoples all over the world are casting off failed
authoritarian rule and are laying down their lives, their fortunes, and their sa-
cred honor in a reach for the free democratic process which my American fore-
bears won through revolution and which I now accept as a routine part of my
life. Surely it is a time for me to join with all voters and renew our pride in par-
ticipating in the majesty of self-government, to demand the cleansing of its un-
swept corners, and to demonstrate by our interest and our vote that we care
about the political process that keeps this land free for ourselves and our posterity.
Id.
165. See id.
166. See Martin Dyckman, Unhealthy Only for Bad Campaigns, ST. PETE. TIMES, May
19, 1996, at 3D.
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registered voters.'6 7 The review board is composed of officers, direc-
tors, and five alternates chosen from the group's general member-
ship.'68 All candidates seeking public office in Pinellas County are
asked to sign a fair campaign practices pledge.' 6' Although the
pledge is voluntary, the board informs the media whether individual
candidates agreed to sign the pledge.'70
Any person can register a complaint with the committee alleging
a violation of the pledge.' 7 ' The review board meets to determine
whether the conduct complained of constitutes a pledge violation.
1 2
If the board determines that there has been an unfair campaign
practice, a hearing is scheduled and both parties are asked to appear
before the board.' 7' While the review board has no legal authority to
enforce rulings or issue sanctions, it does announce its findings to
the news media. 74
Four candidates were cited with violations of the Voluntary Code
of Fair Campaign practices during the 1994 elections.' 75 All four
candidates lost their respective elections. 76 The Pinellas County
Democratic Party supports the Citizens for Fair Campaign Practices;
the Pinellas County Republican Party does not. 7 7 Moreover, the
state Republican Party formally banned Republican committees and
clubs throughout Florida from endorsing any nonpartisan or biparti-
san private group, committee, or organization established for the
purpose of monitoring or regulating political campaigns.'
3. Dade County Fair Campaign Practices Committee
The board of the Dade County Fair Practices Committee has
twenty-five members. 179 Membership is determined by the committee







174. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Ray Aden, Treasurer, Citizens for Fair
Campaign Practices Comm. (Feb. 24, 1995).
175. See Dyckman, supra note 166, at 3D.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. Dale M. Gross, vice-chair of the Pinellas County Republican Party, called
the decision "a day of shame for the state Republican party." Id. Currently, the majority of
incumbents in Pinellas County are Republicans. See id. The prevailing opinions of many
Republicans in the area is that a fair campaign practices board would protect incumbents.
See id. Further, most of the local office holders who sponsor the committee are Republi-
cans. See id. Two of the most outspoken lawmakers on election reform during the 1996
Regular Session, Senator Charlie Crist, Repub., St. Petersburg, and Secretary of State
Sandra B. Mortham, are from Pinellas County.
179. See DECEPTIVE & FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 23.
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and is by invitation only.1 80 Unlike the Citizens for Fair Campaign
Practices Committee, the Dade County committee is loosely estab-
lished and has no formal campaign practices code or formal rules to
govern the committee's actions."' The committee is nonpartisan and
has a diverse ethnic and racial composition. 8 2
The committee limits its scope of inquiry to ethnic issues. 8 3 Any
candidate who makes an ethnic appeal during the course of a cam-
paign is condemned by the committee.18 4 For example, if a white
candidate makes a disparaging remark about an African-American
opponent, the committee will condemn that candidate.'85 Likewise, if
an African-American candidate makes a race-based appeal to Afri-
can-American voters, the committee will condemn that candidate as
well.186
Minority groups have expressed concern that this puts them at an
unfair disadvantage and limits the use of a powerful political tool. 8 7
They also complain that the committee only looks at speech, and
does not consider whether certain campaign contributions are solic-
ited by way of "ethnically" unfair practices. 8 Further, many in the
minority community distrust the committee and believe that it is ac-
tually a tool of the establishment designed to frustrate their candi-
dates.1 9
The committee currently will act upon complaints filed by candi-
dates or upon its own initiative. 19 0 However, the committee chair
stated that the committee will start to act more upon its own initia-
tive.' 9' The committee reviews a complaint and publicly announces
the results of its review. The committee consistently receives laud-
able press coverage, particularly in the Miami Herald.92 Further, a
condemnation by the committee is thought to have a significant im-
pact upon a candidate's chances for success. 93 This fact may only
heighten the concerns of minority communities about the power of
this committee and its potential to discourage minority candidates.
180. See id.
181. See Telephone Interview with Rafael Penalver, Chairperson, Dade County Fair
Campaign Practices Comm. (March 2, 1995).
182. See DECEPTIVE & FALSE ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 23.
183. See id.
184. See id.




189. See id. Mr. Penalver also states that the committee members most likely to par-
ticipate in fair campaign practices decisions are white Anglo-Americans, who comprise a
majority of the committee. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.




V. CURRENT REGULATION THROUGH LEGISLATION
A. Other States
Many states have enacted statutes regulating the speech or con-
duct of candidates for election to public office.19 4 Twenty states have
adopted laws prohibiting certain false statements regarding candi-
dates.'9 5 Violations are generally misdemeanors; however, the pen-
alties range from civil fines to felony convictions.
19 6
Several states have included procedural aspects that make their
laws noteworthy. For example, an Ohio statute provides that if a
person, committee, or corporation falsely identifies itself in a politi-
cal publication, then the Ohio Elections Commission may impose a
fine and refer the matter to a prosecuting attorney. 97
Oregon provides that there is "a rebuttable presumption that a
candidate knows of and consents to any publication or advertisement
prohibited by this section caused by a political committee over which
the candidate exercises any direction and control.' 1 98
Montana law provides that in addition to being subject to a mis-
demeanor penalty, a successful candidate who is found guilty of
making or publishing false statements reflecting upon a candidate's
character or morality or misrepresenting the voting record or posi-
tion on public issues of a candidate may be removed from office. 199
In a further effort to address campaign advertising that is not
necessarily false, several states have adopted or endorsed fair cam-
paign practices codes for candidates. 20 Generally, these codes con-
tain broad principles to be used as a guide in conducting campaigns.
The codes contain such ideals as conducting the campaign without
the use of personal vilification, 20 1 character defamation,20 2 whispering
194. A chart detailing the existence of state statutes containing fair campaign prac-
tices codes and prohibitions on false campaign statements, as well as court challenges to
such statutes, can be found in the Appendix to this Comment.
195. See Appendix.
196. See id. California has elevated such a prohibition to constitutional status. Under
the California Constitution, a candidate may lose his or her office if found liable in a civil
action for making slanderous or libelous statements that were "a major contributing cause
in the defeat of the opposing candidate." CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
197. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.20(A) (Anderson 1996). The Ohio Legislature nev-
ertheless recognized that anonymous materials protected by McIntyre were exempt from this
provision. See Act effective Aug. 22, 1995, ch. 60, § 6, 1995 Ohio Laws (WESTLAW).
198. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.532(3) (1995).
199. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-234(2) (1995).
200. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20440 (Deering 1995); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29B-10
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1101 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-
35-301 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294A.290 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1B-
5 (Michie 1996).
201. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (1995).
202. See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 20440 (Deering 1995); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29B-10
(West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (1995); NEV. REV STAT. ANN. § 294A.290
(Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-lB-5 (Michie 1996).
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campaigns, libel, slander, or scurrilous attacks on one's opponent or
the opponent's personal or family life,20 3 not using campaign material
that misrepresents, distorts, or otherwise falsifies the facts, 0 4 and
not making any appeal to prejudice based upon race, sex, creed, or




The Florida Legislature has addressed the issue of campaign ad-
vertising in several ways. First, section 104.271(1), Florida Statutes,
prohibits candidates from falsely or maliciously accusing an oppos-
ing candidate of violating any provision of the election code. 2 7 A
violation of this section is a third-degree felony and disqualifies the
candidate from holding office. 208 The Florida Elections Commission
(FEC) has no jurisdiction over this section.2 0 9
Section 104.271(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits a candidate from
making, "with actual malice[,] ... any statement about an opposing
candidate which is false."21 This section provides that an aggrieved
candidate may file a complaint with the Division of Elections pursu-
ant to section 106.25, Florida Statutes.211 The FEC has jurisdiction to
203. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20440 (Deering 1995); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29B-10
(West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (1995); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1B-5 (Michie
1996).
204. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29B-10 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-
A, § 1101 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
294A.290 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1B-5 (Michie 1996).
205. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1101 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-
301 (1995).
206. The Washington State Public Disclosure Commission has promulgated rules
adopting a voluntary fair campaign practices code. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-32-030
(1995). The rules provide for complaints alleging a violation of the Code to be filed with
the Commission. See id. After notifying the alleged violator and receiving a response, the
Commission sends the complaint and response to the news media. See id. § 390-32-030(3).
The rules prohibit the Commission from issuing comments or opinions about complaints
or responses. See id. § 390-32-030(5).
207. See FLA. STAT. § 104.271(1) (1995). The statute provides:
Any candidate who, in a primary election or other election, willfully charges
an opposing candidate participating in such election with a violation of any
provision of this code, which charge is known by the candidate making such
charge to be false or malicious, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punish-
able as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083 and, in addition, after conviction
shall be disqualified to hold office.
Id.
208. See id.
209. The FEC is only empowered to hear claims brought under section 104.271(2). See
id. § 104.271(2) (providing that a candidate may file a complaint with the Division against
another candidate for making a false statement with actual malice).
210. Id.
211. See id.; see also id. § 106.25(3) ('For the purposes of Florida Elections Commis-
sion jurisdiction, a violation shall mean the willful performance of an act prohibited by
this chapter or the willful failure to perform an act required by this chapter.").
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hold an expedited hearing and to assess a civil penalty of up to
$5,000 against a candidate found in violation of section 106.25.212
Section 106.143, Florida Statutes, requires all political adver-
tisements to contain certain information.?3 The sponsor of the ad-
vertisement must be identified along with the fact that it is a paid
political advertisement. 2 4 If the advertisement is for a candidate
seeking the nomination of a political party, the advertisement must
identify that party.215 Independent candidates must indicate that
they are running as Independents. 21 6
Further, section 106.143(4), Florida Statutes, regulates the con-
tent of political advertising. 2 7 It prohibits a person who is not an in-
cumbent for the office for which he or she is running from using the
word "re-elect. 2  To avoid the implication of incumbency, such ad-
vertisements must include the word "for" between the candidate's
name and the office for which he or she is running.1 9 A person who
willfully violates section 106.143 is subject to civil penalties imposed
by the FEC. 220
Finally, section 106.071(1), Florida Statutes, requires every politi-
cal advertisement paid for by independent expenditures to contain
the name and address of the person paying for the advertisement
and to carry the following disclaimer: "Paid political advertisement
paid for by (name of person or committee paying for the advertise-
ment) independently of any (candidate or committee). '22' A person
who fails to include the disclaimer required by this section is guilty
of a first-degree misdemeanor.12 2
1. The Division of Elections
Complaints filed under sections 104.271(2) or 106.143 are re-
ceived by the Division of Elections, which conducts an investigation
to determine if there is probable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred. 2 3 A finding of no probable cause may be appealed by the
complainant to the FEC.2 4 The Division also can investigate and
make a probable cause determination without having received a
212. See id. § 104.271(2).
213. See id. § 106.143.
214. See id. § 106.143(1)(a)-(b).
215. See id. § 106.143(2).
216. See id.
217. See id. § 106.143(4).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. § 106.143(7).
221. Id. § 106.071(1).
222. See id. § 106.071(2).
223. See id. § 106.25(4).
224. See id. § 106.25(7).
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sworn complaint.2 5 In addition, the Division has the duty to conduct
random audits and investigations with respect to reports and state-
ments filed under chapter 106, Florida Statutes, and with respect to
the alleged failure to file any required reports and statements. 2 6
2. The Florida Elections Commission
The seven commissioners on the FEC are appointed by the Gov-
ernor, approved by three members of the Cabinet, and subject to
Senate confirmation.2 7 The Chair is designated by the Governor. 2 8
No more than four commissioners may be of the same political
party.229 Commissioners are appointed to four-year terms and may
not serve more than two terms.230 Commissioners do not receive a
salary, but do receive travel and per diem compensation for expenses
associated with the performance of their duties.2 13
The FEC was created by statute within DOS.232 Section 106.24,
Florida Statutes, provides that the FEC shall not be subject to con-
trol, supervision, or direction by DOS in the performance of its du-
ties.23 3 The FEC has no staff of its own; the Division of Elections
provides administrative support and services to the FEC.234 The at-
torney general's office provides the FEC with an assistant attorney
general who acts as general counsel.2 5
The FEC determines violations of chapter 106.236 Upon finding a
violation, the FEC may levy civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each
225. See id. § 106.25(2).
226. See id.
227. See id. § 106.24(1); see also COMM. ON ETHICS & ELEC., FLORIDA ELECTIONS
COMMISSION: OVERVIEW 1 (Oct. 1995) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Elec. Reform)
[hereinafter FEC OVERVIEW]. The Legislature created the FEC in 1973 and transferred
responsibility for investigating violations to the Department of Legal Affairs. See id. at 11.
Local candidate and committee complaints are given to the state's attorney. See id. Be-
cause election law violations were not a priority for either body, the Legislature also
vested the authority to impose civil or criminal penalties with the Division and the FEC in
1977. See id.
228. See FLA. STAT. § 106.24(1) (1995).
229. See id. A commissioner may not be a member of any county, state, or national
committee of a political party, or be an officer in any partisan political club or organiza-
tion. See id. § 106.24(2). In addition, a commissioner cannot hold or be a candidate for any
other public office, or have held an elective public office or office in a political party in the
year immediately preceding appointment. See id.




234. See id. § 106.24(4).
235. See FEC OVERVIEW, supra note 227, at 3. The director of the Division is not in.
volved in FEC investigations and does not see complaints until the statement of findings
are completed. See id. Thereafter, the director, who has the final say on the wording of the
statement of findings, may elect to sign the findings or rewrite them. See id.
236. See id. at 6.
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violation of chapter 106 and up to $5,000 for violations of section
104.271(2).237 The FEC also hears appeals of fines levied for the late
filing of campaign treasurer reports. 28 The FEC meets, on average,
once every two months.239 It conducts a hearing, if requested, when
probable cause is found. 40 To date, the FEC has been unable to
shorten the time between receipt of the complaint and a Division
probable cause determination to under six months, by which time
the election at issue has usually taken place.24" '
A finding of probable cause by the Division is referred to the FEC,
which considers the case and makes its own probable cause determi-
nation.2 42 If probable cause is found, the respondent is entitled to re-
quest and receive a full evidentiary hearing. 43 All complaints, pa-
pers, and investigations remain confidential until the Division ren-
ders a probable cause determination.2 44 If a finding of no probable
cause is appealed, the information must remain confidential until
the appeal is resolved. 24 If the FEC finds probable cause within
thirty days before an election, the findings remain confidential until
noon of the day following the election.2 46
The FEC is empowered to issue subpoenas and invoke other nec-
essary processes to compel the attendance of witnesses at the hear-
ing.24 Following the hearing, the FEC determines whether a viola-
tion has occurred and whether to levy a civil penalty.248 The FEC has
the authority to bring civil actions for relief, including actions for
temporary or permanent injunctions.2 49 Since the enactment of sec-
tion 104.271(2) in 1985, at least forty-two complaints have been filed
alleging false statements with actual malice. 20 The FEC has found
violations in two of these cases. 2 1
237. See FLA. STAT. §§ 104.271(2), 106.265(1) (1995).
238. See FEC OVERVIEW, supra note 227, at 6.
239. See id. at 8.
240. See id. Following the hearing, the FEC makes a final determination of whether
there has been a violation. See id. Section 104.271(2) requires an expedited hearing. See
FLA. STAT. § 104.271(2) (1995). In such a case, the FEC may schedule a hearing within 30
days of the probable cause finding by the Division. See id. Beginning in 1994, some of the
formal hearings have been referred to administrative law judges in the Division of Admin-
istrative Hearings. See FEC OVERVIEW, supra note 227, at 8.
241. See FEC OVERVIEW, supra note 227, at 8.
242. See id. at 17.
243. See id.






250. See Memorandum from C.L. Ivey, Investigator Specialist, Div. of Elec., to Bar-
bara M. Linthicum, Ass't Gen. Couns. (Dec. 13, 1995) (on file with Division).
251. See In re Clayton M. Reynolds III, FEC No. 90-69, Final Order 6 (on file with Fla.
Elec. Comm'n); Division of Elections v. Fischer, FEC No. 94-122, Proposed Final Order 28
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3. Case Studies: In re Clayton M. Reynolds III and Division of
Elections v. Fischer
During the 1990 general election, Clayton M. Reynolds III, a
candidate for Florida House District 27, stated in advertisements
mailed to voters that his opponent, Representative Stan Bainter,1
52
attended sporting events paid for by political action committees
(PACs).2 5 The ad also stated that Representative Bainter supported
a committee that could approve a state income tax without the vote
of the electorate.21 4 The FEC determined that the candidate knew
Representative Bainter had not attended any sports activities paid
for by PACs. 55 The FEC also determined that Reynolds reviewed the
law regarding the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission and
knew that the Commission could not approve a state income tax
without the approval of the electorate.25 The FEC fined Reynolds
$5,000, suspending $4,000 of the fine if Reynolds paid $1,000 within
sixty days of the final order.257
The Division achieved its second victory under section 104.271 in
1996.25 s The case involved two candidates for the Lake County School
Board in the 1994 general election. 2 9 Kyleen Fischer accused her op-
ponent of organizing Lake County residents to close down a pre-
dominantly African-American high school in Eustis, Florida.260 The
(on file with Fla. Elec. Comm'n). The low prosecution rates may not be based solely upon
the legal issues, but may be influenced by the political arena. See Interview with Barbara
Linthicum, Ass't Gen. Couns., Fla. Elec. Comm'n, Tallahassee, Fla. (Aug. 15, 1995). Com-
plaints that bear significant resemblance to the facts of Reynolds, see infra notes 252-57
and accompanying text, were dismissed. See Linthicum, supra.
252. Repub., Eustis.
253. See Reynolds, FEC No. 90-69, Final Order at 3. The front of the first ad mailed to
voters read: "HAS OUR REPRESENTATIVE INVITED YOU TO THE SUPER BOWL?
KENTUCKY DERBY? WORLD SERIES?" Id. The reverse side read: "PAC'S TAKE
LEGISLATORS ALL THE TIME AND WE PAY THE BILL! DOES OUR INCUMBENT
DESERVE ANOTHER CHANCE TO GO TO THE SUPER BOWL? WE CANNOT
AFFORD OUR INCUMBENT 'STAN'; Vote for a change ... From Your Door To The
House Floor; CLAY REYNOLDS WILL WORK FOR YOU." Id.
254. See id. This second advertisement read: "WHY DOES OUR REPRESENTATIVE
BELIEVE IN A STATE INCOME TAXT Id. at 4. The reverse side read: "HE SUPPORTS
THE COMMITTEE THAT COULD APPROVE A STATE INCOME TAX WITHOUT OUR
VOTE! DOES OUR INCUMBENT DESERVE ANOTHER CHANCE TO SUPPORT THIS
GROUP .. . AGAIN? WE CANNOT AFFORD OUR INCUMBENT 'STAN'[;] Vote For A
Change... From Your Door To The House Floor; CLAY REYNOLDS WILL WORK FOR
YOU." Id.
255. See id. at 6.
256. See id.
257. See id. The final order was issued on September 29, 1993, and the Division in-
formed Reynolds of the FEC's findings shortly thereafter. See id. Reynolds paid the $1,000
fine by October 23, 1993, and the case was closed. See id.
258. See Division of Elections v. Fischer, FEC No. 94-122, Proposed Final Order 28 (on
file with Fla. Elec. Comm'n)..
259. See id. at 4.
260. See id. at 5.
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Division found that Fischer participated in drafting the mailed ad-
vertisements, knew the advertisements were false, and paid for the
ads out of her campaign account.26 Fischer beat her opponent by
1,170 votes.262 The Division recommended that she be fined $5,000.263
All other cases brought under section 104.271(2) have ended with
findings of no probable cause.26 4 Both the falsity and actual malice
elements make finding a violation under this section extremely diffi-
cult. Similarly, although there have been several cases prosecuted
under section 106.143, most have sustained findings of no probable
cause based upon a requirement of willfulness.2 65 According to the
Division, most complaints are filed against first-time candidates. 266
VI. 1996 FLORIDA ELECTION REFORM PROPOSALS
Taking into account the constitutional case law and the renewed
interest in election reform, the Florida Legislature recently at-
tempted to cure the defects in the current Florida campaign laws
through both specific and omnibus election reform bills.267
A: Committee on Ethics and Elections Proposal
Sections 104.271, 106.071, and 106.143, in their present form,
lack many elements that the U.S. Supreme Court has determined
are essential to the constitutional regulation of political speech.
268
Thus, the House Committee on Ethics & Elections recommended
that section 104.271 be amended to include immediate judicial re-
view and a clear and convincing burden of proof standard to comply
with the Sullivan test.26 9 The Committee also recommended that the
provision's fines be extended to any person responsible for the ad-
vertisement, rather than just the candidate, by incorporating the
doctrine of respondeat superior. 2 0 The provision would make any
person associated with the advertisement on behalf of the candidate
vicariously liable for a violation.27" ' The Committee further recom-
261. See id. at 4.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Ivey, supra note 250 (attaching a list of cases disposed of by the FEC since
1987).
265. See id.
266. See Interview with Barbara Linthicum, Ass't Gen. Couns., Fla. Elec. Comm'n,
Tallahassee, Fla. (Aug. 15, 1995) (notes on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Elec. Reform).
267. See Fla. CS for HB 633 (1996); Fla. CS for HB 1005 (1996); Fla. CS for HB 1151
(1996); Fla. CS for HB 1907 (1996).
268. See discussion supra Part III.
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mended increasing the fine for publishing false statements and
making the candidate personally liable for the fine.
27 2
In addition, the Committee recommended that sections 106.071
and 106.143 be amended to eliminate the disclaimer requirement on
certain political advertisements produced and distributed by indi-
viduals or groups. 273 The Committee also believed that if the statutes
were amended to comport with McIntyre, the amended statutes
would be struck down under article I, section 23 of the Florida Con-
stitution2 74 because of a Florida citizen's right to privacy. 275 The
Committee further suggested that anonymous political publications
could involve violations of campaign finance reporting lawsY.2 6 Can-
didates and political committees are required to report campaign ex-
penditures. 27" The FEC investigates appropriate allegations to de-
termine whether a candidate or political committee was involved in
the dissemination of anonymous publications. 78 If the process were
widespread, according to the Committee, it could effectively circum-
vent any limited anonymity exemption for individuals drafted into
the statutes because the FEC would be required to identify the pro-
ponent of the publication. 29 The Committee suggested that a solu-
tion would be to draft an exemption to the public records law20 to
protect identities obtained in this manner.28 '
B. Committee Substitute for House Bill 633
Committee Substitute for House Bill 633 would have amended
sections 104.271, 106.071, and 106.143, Florida Statutes, to meet
current constitutional free speech requirements regarding false or
anonymous political statements and to promote truthfulness in po-
272. See id.
273. See Internal Memorandum from Jonathan Fox, Staff Attorney, Fla. H.R. Comm.
on Ethics & Elec., to Sarah Bradshaw, Staff Director, Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ethics & Elec.
(Nov. 17, 1995) (discussing the impact of McIntyre on anonymous campaign literature). It
was the Committee's view that the McIntyre decision appeared to render unconstitutional
Florida's blanket ban on all anonymous political advertising involving written publica-
tions. See id. The McIntyre Court specifically reserved ruling on whether its decision
would apply to other forms of unidentified communication, such as anonymous radio or
television ads. See 115 S. Ct. at 1514 n.3.
274. This section provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.
This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records
and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
275. See Fox, supra note 273.
276. See id.
277. FLA. STAT. §§ 106.021, .05-.07 (1995).
278. See FEC OVERVIEW, supra note 227, at 6.
279. See Fox, supra note 273.
280. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
281. See Fox, supra note 273.
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litical advertising and campaigning.28 2 The bill would have increased
the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate actual malice, provided
for an expedited judicial review process, and permitted individuals
and groups spending less than $500 annually to distribute anony-
mous political advertisements.
283
To encourage a greater degree of ethical behavior in the election
process, the bill would have expanded the categories of parties sub-
ject to administrative penalties for making false statements about a
candidate. 284 Under the proposed law, political parties, political
committees, committees of continuous existence, and persons associ-
ated with such entities would all have been subject to the penal-
ties.28 5 The bill also would have increased the maximum fine that the
FEC could impose for violations from $5,000 to $10,000.286 The bill
identified factors that would have been considered in determining
the amount of the penalty and would have subjected everyone involved
in the violation to the fine.2 87 Finally, the bill would have reduced,
from a felony to a misdemeanor, the punishment for willfully misrep-
resenting that an opposing candidate violated the election code. 288
C. Committee Substitute for House Bill 1005
Senate hearings concerning the 70,000 calls placed to Florida citi-
zens by Governor Chiles' reelection campaign28 9 prompted Commit-
tee Substitute for House Bill 1005.290 The bill would have required a
telephone caller supporting or opposing any candidate, elected public
official, or issue to disclose the identity of each person or organiza-
tion that paid for any of the costs of the call.29 ' The bill also would
have required the caller to disclose the name of the candidate and
the office sought if the sponsor of the call was affiliated with a can-
didate.292 However, calls between individuals who knew each other
and for which the caller received no compensation would have been
exempted from these disclosure requirements.293 The bill would have
prohibited the caller from stating or implying that he or she repre-
282. See Fla. CS for HB 633 (1996); see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ethics & Elec., PCB EE
96-04 (1996) Staff Analysis 1 (Dec. 19, 1995) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Elec. Reform).
283. See Fla. CS for HB 633, §§ 1, 2. (1996). Both individuals and groups would have
been required to act independently to avoid reporting requirements. See id. § 2.





289. See Segal, supra note 6, at F13.
290. See Fla. CS for HB 1005 (1996).
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sented a person or organization that was either fictitious or had not
authorized such representation in writing.
294
The intent of the bill was to reduce the use of false or fraudulent
representation of sponsoring organizations and to better define af-
filiations between those sponsoring or paying for the telephone so-
licitation and candidates or their campaigns.295 Further, requiring
disclaimers by sponsors would have provided more information to
the public to allow it to assess the credibility of political telephone
solicitations. 9 6
D. Committee Substitute for House Bill 1151
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1151 was an omnibus elec-
tion reform bill that incorporated many of Secretary of State
Mortham's 1996 legislative proposals. 97 As one of its primary com-
ponents, the bill adopted the Collins Center's voluntary fair cam-
paign practices pledge and would have implemented the pledge
through a statewide Fair Campaign Practices Board.29 The bill also
would have required sponsor identification for political solicitation
via telephone or the Internet299 and would have repealed the second
primary election.300 In addition, the bill provided that "technical as-
sistance" and "voter mobilization" services provided by a party to a
candidate be counted toward the $50,000 aggregate contribution
limit.,0 '
294. See id.
295. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ethics & Elec., HB 1005 (1996) Staff Analysis 2 (Mar. 4,
1996) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Elec. Reform).
296. See id.
297. See Fla. CS for HB 1151 (1996); see also supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
298. See id. § 2. The Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate
President, the Senate minority leader, and the board chairperson each would have ap-
pointed one board member; the secretary of state would have appointed the board chair-
person. See id. The board would have investigated complaints of any candidate signing the
pledge who alleged violations by any other candidate signing the pledge, and would have
issued public findings regarding violations. See id. The board would have had no inde-
pendent sanction power and would not have been able to assess any civil or criminal pen-
alty for violations. See id. (providing that the board must refer violations to the FEC or
the state attorney's office).
299. See id. § 3. Currently, there is no requirement that a candidate or other person
engaging in telephone solicitation or political polling identify who is paying for the call.
Section 106.143, Florida Statutes, requires all "political advertisements" to identify the
sponsor. See FLA. STAT. § 106.143 (1995). However, the definition of "political advertise-
ment" specifically excluded paid communications by the "spoken word in direct conversa-
tion." See id. § 106.011(17). The bill would have subjected both media to the same form of
sponsor identification as all other political advertisements under current law. See Fla. CS
for HB 1151, § 3 (1996).
300. Fla. CS for HB 1151, § 51 (1996).
301. See id. § 19. Part of this bill was targeted at closing a loophole in the campaign
financing laws that enabled persons, political committees, and committees of continuous
existence to effectively circumvent the $500 contribution limit by funneling earmarked
funds through the political parties to their candidates. See id.
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E. Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907: The Election
Campaign Reform Act of 1996
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907, the Election Campaign
Reform Act of 1996,312 was one of the largest election reform propos-
als in Florida history. The bill would have doubled penalties for false
statements from $5,000 to $10,000, and would have expanded the
scope of parties subject to penalties.3 1 3 The bill also would have re-
quired additional disclaimers on all political advertisements and
would have provided for the vicarious liability of candidates and po-
litical groups whose agents or employees made false statements
about a candidate.3 14 The bill would have established the FEC as an
independent budget entity within DOS and also would have created
a voluntary fair campaign practices pledge to be administered by the
FEC.3 0 5 Further, the bill would have limited turnbacks of surplus
campaign funds from a candidate to a political party to $10,000 and
would have subjected a political party making excess campaign con-
tributions to large civil penalties. 30 6 Finally, the bill would have al-
lowed political parties to allocate advance expenditures to candi-
dates. 07
1. Disclaimers
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907 would have exempted
individuals and groups spending less than $500 per year on political
campaigns from identifying themselves on written political adver-
tisements, provided the individual or group paid for the advertise-
ment and acted independently of any candidate or political party.0 8
Additionally, any political advertisement produced by or on behalf of
a candidate, with the exception of those paid for by independent ex-
penditures, would have required the candidate's advance approval. 30 9
This approval would have been required to appear in the advertise-
ment and the candidate would have been required to provide written
authorization to the distribution medium. 10 The bill also would have
required a political party to obtain candidate approval for all politi-
cal advertisements produced on behalf of the candidate.3 1 1
302. Fla. CS for HB 1907 (1996).
303. See id. § 2.
304. See id.
305. See id. §§ 5, 14.
306. See id. § 9.
307. See id.
308. See id. § 8.
309. See id. § 10.
310. See id.
311. See id. A recent case addressed the issue of requiring "approved and authorized
by" disclaimers on political advertisements. In Shrink Missouri Gouernment PAC v.
Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), a Missouri
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2. Fair Campaign Practices
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907 essentially would have
codified the voluntary code of fair campaign practices developed by
the Collins Center. 12 The bill would have offered candidates the op-
portunity to sign a fair campaign practices pledge and would have
empowered the FEC to investigate and hold expedited hearings on
complaints lodged against statewide and legislative candidates. 33
The FEC also would have investigated complaints against any can-
didate who signed the pledge. 314 The FEC's findings would then have
been made public."5
3. Contribution Limits
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907 sought to include costs
for telephone solicitations within the $50,000 per candidate contri-
bution limit applicable to political parties.31 Polling services, re-
search services, and salaries for full-time employees of the political
party would have remained outside the contribution limit.311 These
expenses are currently required to be reported by both the candidate
and the party. 18 All other in-kind contributions, including those for
technical assistance and voter mobilization efforts, also would have
remained outside the contribution limit under the bill.31 9
The bill would have further precluded all in-kind contributions by
political parties through the mailing of printed material to voters
within ten days of an election.3 0 This provision might have reduced
the last-minute negative political advertisements mailed to voters by
the political parties.
federal district court ruled on the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that required
negative political advertisements by candidates or candidate committees to contain a dis-
claimer that the advertisement had been "approved and authorized by" the candidate. See
id. at 1254-55. The court struck down the statute, finding that the disclaimer "requires a
speaker to make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit" in violation of the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee. Id. at 1255-56. The court also held that, absent a dem-
onstration by the state that false and fraudulent campaign advertising was a major problem,
the state's interests in using the disclaimer to discourage false statements and to hold candi-
dates accountable for negative advertisements, although legitimate, were not compelling. See
id. at 1256. Finally, the court held that the Missouri statute was not narrowly tailored to ac-
complish the state's purposes: "It seems that to whatever extent the state wishes to impose
accountability and lessen the opportunity for deniability, the 'paid for by' requirement pro-
motes that goal, without the need for the added 'approved and authorized' language." Id.
312. See Fla. CS for HB 1907, § 5 (1996); see also supra Part IV.C.1.





318. See FLA. STAT. §§ 106.07, .29 (1995).




The bill would have prohibited state or county executive commit-
tees of political parties from contributing to candidates beyond the
$50,000 limit 3 I and would have subjected the committees to civil
penalties of twice the amount of excess contributions. 32  This would
have changed existing law, which imposes sanctions against candi-
dates alone for accepting excess contributions.123
4. Surplus Funds-Turnbacks
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907 would have permitted a
candidate to endorse, cash, and dispose of refund checks received af-
ter all surplus funds from a campaign had been disposed of and the
necessary disposition reports had been filed with DOS, provided that
the candidate filed an amended report with DOS.32 4 The bill also
would have limited to $10,000 the amount of surplus funds, or
"turnbacks," that a candidate could give to his or her political
party. 3 5 Limiting the amount of funds that could be turned back to a
candidate's party might have diminished the public perception that
these dollars were buying influence with the party and party lead-
ers.
5. Independent Florida Elections Commission
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1907 would have trans-
formed the FEC into an independent body.3 26 Further, the bill would
have authorized staffing for the FEC and would have established it
as a separate budget entity.32 7 In addition, the bill would have reduced
the FEC's membership from seven to five, and would have changed the
appointment process to include appointees by the President of the Sen-
ate and the Speaker of the House.22 The bill also would have trans-
ferred the authority to investigate complaints and determine prob-
able cause regarding campaign finance violations and false or mali-
cious political advertisements from the Division to the FEC.2 9
321. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 106.08(2) (1995) (providing that no more than
$25,000 may be contributed prior to the 28th day before the election).
322. See Fla. CS for HB 1907, § 8 (1996).
323. See FLA. STAT. § 106.08(6) (1995).
324. See Fla. CS for HB 1907, § 9 (1996).
325. See id.
326. See id. § 14. The bill's sponsor, Representative Tracy Upchurch, Dem., St.
Augustine, 1992-1996, believed that the FEC should function independently rather than
under the control of a partisan secretary of state. "We are balancing a very self-serving in-
terest against what will restore public confidence and ensure good and fair elections."
Lucy Morgan, Campaign Reform Expected to Come Calling, ST. PETE. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1996, at 5D (quoting Rep. Upchurch).
327. See Fla. CS for HB 1907, § 14 (1996).
328. See id.
329. See id. § 15.
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F. How Politics Stymied Productive Legislation
As the 1996 Regular Session wore on, legislators interested in
meaningful election reform feared that the campaign reform bills
were in trouble.130 Secretary of State Mortham had been negotiating
with the opponents of her reform package throughout the final week of
the Regular Session. The Senate Committee on Executive Business,
Ethics and Elections, the House Committee on Ethics and Elections,
and Governor Chiles were prepared to see the bills passed. The plan
was for Representative Tracy Upchurch 331 to simply move the bill on
the floor of the House, obtain House approval, and for Senator Jack
Latvala 331 to push it through the Senate after its transmittal there.
333
On the final day of the Regular Session, Committee Substitute for
House Bill 1151 was amended to include a combination of House Bills
101,334 235,335 633,336 1005,337 1151,338 and 1907.319 Representative Up-
church offered the amendment and it was temporarily deferred. 340 Rep-
resentative John Thrasher 34' tried to move the bill with the amendment;
however, much to the surprise of the bill's sponsors, Committee Substi-
tute for House Bill 1151 was left pending on the floor because two mem-
bers of the Committee on Ethics and Elections believed that the tele-
phone solicitation provision had been added to the amendment. 342
Representative Beryl Roberts-Burke 343 informed the House that
the provision had been defeated in committee and was audibly angry
that it had been reinserted. 44 She expressed concern that each vio-
lation of this provision would cost a candidate $1,000.145 Representa-
330. Business and union lobbyists were concerned that the disclosure requirements
would have a negative impact on telephone solicitations. See Lucy Morgan, Campaign
Call Reform to Return, Says Crist, ST. PETE. TIMES, May 9, 1996, at 5B.
331. Dem., St. Augustine, 1992-1996.
332. Repub., Palm Harbor.
333. See Martin Dyckman, Reform Wasn't In Their Interest, ST. PETE. TIMES, May 7,
1996, at 9A. The Republican leadership in the Senate said the secretary's package was not
a priority; therefore, the bill would have to be passed through the House to put pressure
on the Senate. See Ron Barlett, Election Laws Far Too Sacred for Politicians, TAMPA
TRIB., May 11, 1996, at lB.
334. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 2182 (Reg. Sess. 1996) (amendment 1 to Fla. CS for HB 1151, § 5
(1996)).
335. See id. at 2183 (amendment 1 to § 7).
336. See id. at 2181 (amendment 1 to § 1) (keeping intact the false statement and dis-
claimer identification provisions).
337. See id. at 2189 (amendment 1 to § 33).
338. See id. at 2181, 2187-88 (amendment 1 to §§ 3, 29).
339. See id. at 2181 (amendment 1 to § 1).
340. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 2219 (Reg. Sess. 1996).
341. Repub., Orange Park.
342. See Fla. H.R., unofficial tape recording of proceedings (May 3, 1996) (on file with






tive Roberts-Burke also stated that she believed a sixty-page
amendment was too long to consider given the late hour. 46
A second committee member, Representative Alzo Reddick,
347
stated that passing this amendment would be like performing "brain
surgery with a machete" and that it was not good public policy to
vote on such an amendment at the "midnight hour."
3 4
Representative Upchurch explained that he had attempted to
speak with all the committee members and that he believed that he
had satisfied Representative Roberts-Burke's concern over the tele-
phone solicitation provision.149 Nevertheless, he acquiesced to the
concerns expressed by Representatives Roberts-Burke and Reddick
and temporarily deferred the bill.3 0 However, the bill was never re-
considered and was effectively killed for the year.35' Thus, at 10:50
p.m. on the final day of the 1996 regular session, several years of
work and a two-year commitment to election reform were stymied
because two members of the Committee on Ethics and Elections be-
lieved a sixty-page amendment was too long to consider for pas-
sage. 352 Countless hours of planning were wasted and likely constitu-
tionally permissive proposals vaporized because of the power of lobby-
ists and the lack of true legislative commitment to election reform.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of negative campaign advertising is complex. Negative
campaigning quickly degenerates into a vicious cycle where voters
become increasingly desensitized, causing candidates to hire increas-
ingly creative campaign strategists who seek to incite public pas-
sions, no matter how negative, to get the public to vote for their
candidates.
State legislatures that truly desire to curb negative campaigning
must operate within a narrow regulatory environment. Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that to protect free speech,
such regulation must withstand strict scrutiny. Therefore, regulation
alone cannot address the serious negative campaign practices that
have become commonplace in Florida.
The attack on negative campaigning must be twofold. First, vot-






351. See FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS at 315, CS for HB 1151.
352. That same evening, the House passed a property insurance reform bill that was
91 pages long. See Fla. CS for HB 2314 (1996); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 2428 (Reg. Sess. 1996).
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the issues, and support groups such as the Pinellas County Fair
Campaign Practices Board. To turn a deaf ear on political campaigns
simply because of distasteful advertising would take for granted rep-
resentative democracy. From the American Revolution through the
civil rights movement, thousands of Americans have given their lives
to secure the right to choose their representatives.
Second, the media must continue to serve the public's interest in
elections. The Florida media successfully exposed both the magni-
tude and the ridiculousness of the 70,000 "scare calls" made to senior
citizens during the last gubernatorial election.
The election reform bills filed during the 1996 Regular Session
should have passed. The Legislature simply failed to make reform a
top priority. Lobbying efforts to organize campaigns aimed at per-
suading legislatures tend to work. The House Committee on Ethics
and Elections, the Senate Committee on Executive Business, Ethics
and Elections, and DOS should have recognized the lobbyists' power
and severed the various election proposals from those that were
more controversial. Further, the Legislature consists of 160 experts
on elections; hence, when "too much" regulation is proposed, these
experts consistently kill the bills.
Election reformers need to sever noncontroversial provisions from
the political hot potatoes and inch toward progress rather than creat-
ing omnibus bills that are headed for defeat. However, the leadership
in both chambers must truly commit itself if election reform is to be
accomplished through the political process. Reformers must try to pass
legislation early in the regular session rather than trying to push it
through during the final days, when members are fatigued and are
primarily concerned with passing bills that affect their constituencies.
Finally, candidates must be willing to stand up to political con-
sultants instead of blindly deferring to the consultants' judgment.
While it might be possible to create an advertising board akin to
those of the American Bar Association or the American Medical As-
sociation, it is unlikely that the multi-million dollar campaign ad-
vertising industry will regulate itself voluntarily. The public must
demand less emotionally charged soundbites and more substantive
debates on relevant issues. The most promising possibility is to in-
crease the number of fair campaign practices boards around the
state and to publish the boards' findings, thus shaming the candi-
dates who break their signed pledges. Candidates will listen when
there are votes at stake. Voters must realize that the ability to cast a





State F~air Campaign Laws Prohibiting Court Challenges?
Practices Code? False Campaign
Statements?





California CAL. ELEC. CODE § CAL. ELEC. CODE § No
20440 (Deering 18351 (Deering
1995) 1995) (maximum
fine $1,000)
Colorado No COLO. REV. STAT. § No
1-13-109 (1996)
(misdemeanor)
Connecticut No (voluntary code No
in effect '74-'78)
Delaware No No
Florida No FLA. STAT. § Yes
104.271(1) (1995)
(civil penalty)
Georgia No No -
Hawaii No No -
Idaho No No -







Louisiana No LA. REV. STAT. ANN. State v. Burgess,
§ 1463c(1) (West 543 So. 2d 1332 (La.
1995) (misdemeanor) 1989) (holding
unconstitutional
prior version of §
1463c(1))
Maine ME. REV. STAT. No
ANN. tit. 21-A, §
1101 (West 1995)
Maryland No No
Massachusetts No MASS. ANN. LAws No
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State Fair Campaign Laws Prohibiting Couirt Challenges?
Practices Code? False Campaign
Statemnents?




Minnesota No MINN. STAT. § State v. Jude, No.
211B.06 (1996) C5-96-509, 1996 WL
(misdemeanor) 588693 (Minn. Ct.
App. Oct. 15, 1996)
(finding § 211B.06
overbroad)




Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § MONT. CODE ANN. § No
13-35-301 (1995) 13-35-234 (1995)
(misdemeanor)
Nebraska No No
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. NEV. REV. STAT. No
ANN. § 294A.290 ANN. § 294A.330
(Michie 1995) (Michie 1995)
New No No -
Hampshire
New Jersey No No -
New Mexico No No -
New York N.Y. ELEC. LAW § No
3-106 (McKinney
1996)
North Carolina No N.C. GEN. STAT. § No
163-274(8) (Michie
1996) (misdemeanor)
North Dakota No N.D. CENT. CODE § No
16.1-10-04 (Michie
1995) (misdemeanor)
Ohio No OHIO REV. CODE McIntyre v. Ohio
ANN. § 3517.21 Elections Comm'n,
(Anderson 1996) 115 S. Ct. 1511
(misdemeanor) (1995); Pestrak v.
Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 926 F. 2d
573 (6th Cir. 1991)
Oklahoma No No -






State Fair Campaign Laws Prohibiting Court Challenges?
Practices Code? False Campaign
Statements?
Pennsylvania No No -
Rhode Island No No -
South Carolina No No -
South Dakota No No -
Tennessee No TENN. CODE ANN. § No
2-19-142 (1996)
Texas No No





Washington WASH. ADMIN. WASH. REV. CODE No
CODE § 390-32-030 ANN. § 42.17.530
(1995) (Michie 1996)
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 3- W. VA. CODE § 3-8- No
1B-5 (Michie 1996) 11(c) (Michie 1996)




District of No No
Columbia
Puerto Rico No No -I
19971

